British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835 (2000)
The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper (), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case propensity theories, one due to Miller and the later Popper, and the other to Fetzer. The three approaches are compared by examining how they deal with a key problem for the propensity approach, namely the relationship between propensity and causality and Humphreys' paradox.
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Citations of this work BETA
Quantum Propensities.Mauricio Suárez - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):418-438.
An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information.Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.
The Propensity Theory: A Decision-Theoretic Restatement.M. Albert - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):587-603.
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