Peirce snatching: Towards a more pragmatic view of evidence [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):207-231 (1999)
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Abstract

The running debate between Peter Achinstein and his critics concerning the nature of scientific evidence is misguided as each side attempts to explicate a distinct notion of evidence. Achinstein's approach, however, is valuable in helping to point out a problem with Carnap's statistical relevance model. By claiming an increase in probability to be necessary for evidence, the received view is incapable of accounting for evidence which is statistically irrelevant but explanatorily relevant. A broader view of evidence which can account for pragmatic concerns such as explanation is thereby required.

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Steve Gimbel
Gettysburg College

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References found in this work

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The inference to the best explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
The Nature of Explanation.Peter Achinstein - 1983 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Studies in the logic of confirmation.Carl A. Hempel - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.

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