Diltheyan Varieties of Double Hermeneutics in the Human Sciences

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (1):0048393112449657 (2012)
In this volume, the authors seek to analyze the actual influence of Dilthey’s philosophy of the human sciences on various contemporary debates. They are convinced that Dilthey’s interpretative-holistic epistemology provides a good starting point for engaging with alternative conceptions of the human sciences. Throughout the volume, the authors illustrate the importance of Dilthey’s main concepts for constituting the human-scientific objects of inquiry qua historically contextualized objects of inquiry. It is the interpretative reflection on the forms of human beings’ self-understanding of their situatedness that requires the implementation of double hermeneutics in the constitution of such objects. In my review, I concentrate chiefly on five versions of double hermeneutics discussed by the authors in different methodological contexts
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393112449657
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,674
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Shaun Gallagher (2011). Hermeneutyka i nauki kognitywne. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2):197 - 212.
Shaun Gallagher (2004). Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):162-174.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

6 ( #532,882 of 1,903,046 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #446,009 of 1,903,046 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.