In Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press (2011)
I argue that Stroud's nonreductionism about meaning is insufficiently motivated. First, given that he rejects the assumption that grasp of an expression's meaning guides or instructs us in its use, he has no reason to accept Kripke's arguments against dispositionalism or related reductive views. Second, his argument that reductive views are impossible because they attempt to explain language “from outside” rests on an equivocation between two senses in which an explanation of language can be from outside language. I offer a partially reductive account of meaning which appeals both to speakers’ dispositions to produce and respond to utterances in naturalistically specifiable ways, and to the normative attitudes they adopt, in so doing, to their own behavior. This account is supported, I argue, by Stroud's early treatment of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and in particular of the agreement in primitive judgments or reactions which Wittgenstein takes to be required for linguistic communication.
|Keywords||Stroud Kripke Wittgenstein Naturalism about meaning Normativity of meaning Meaning skepticism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Meaning Skepticism and Normativity.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
Meaning, Justification, and'Primitive Normativity'.Adrian Haddock - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
Meaning, Understanding, and Practice: Philosophical Essays.Barry Stroud - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules, and Context.Daniel Whiting - 2010 - In The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
The Normativity of Meaning.Alan Millar - 2002 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57-73.
A Reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to Dispositionalism About Meaning.Jakob Hohwy - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68.
Review of Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. [REVIEW]Hannah Ginsborg - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1175-1186.
Meaning In Speech and In Thought.Stephen Schiffer - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):141-159.
Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Nature of Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (2):105-121.
Added to index2011-10-11
Total downloads167 ( #26,499 of 2,152,215 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #59,772 of 2,152,215 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.