Cambridge University Press (1990)

Authors
Carl Ginet
Cornell University
Abstract
This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
Keywords Action  Action Theory  Cause  Determinism  Explanation  Free Will  Intentional  Metaphysics  Mind  Voluntary Action
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Reprint years 2012
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Call number B105.A35.G56 1990
ISBN(s) 9780521381246   052138124X   9781139173780   052138818X
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What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
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The Contours of Control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.

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