Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (1990)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
|
Keywords | Action Action Theory Cause Determinism Explanation Free Will Intentional Metaphysics Mind Voluntary Action |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2012 |
Buy this book | $38.79 new (1% off) $38.99 from Amazon Amazon page |
Call number | B105.A35.G56 1990 |
ISBN(s) | 9780521381246 052138124X 9781139173780 052138818X 9780521388184 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.
View all 221 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Ginet on the Problem of Action Externalization.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):841-855.
A Critique of Carl Ginet's Intrinsic Theory of Volition.Beverly K. Hinton - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:101 - 120.
Unintentional Collective Action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Cornell University Press.
On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction.Jennifer Hornsby, Carl Ginet, Kathleen Lennon & Carlos J. Moya - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498.
Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion.Robert N. Audi - 1974 - American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1):1-14.
The Intentionality of Intention and Action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2010 - In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality.Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
209 ( #56,072 of 2,520,901 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #52,964 of 2,520,901 )
2009-01-28
Total views
209 ( #56,072 of 2,520,901 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #52,964 of 2,520,901 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads