Abstract

Some important attempts at construction an universal scientific languages are carried out during the last five decades in the methodology of science. Among them it could be mentioned such as the logico-positivistic intention for a building a historical invariant observational language, Carnap’s physicalism, the different attempts at building an universal language based on some version of the theory of system or on the cybernetics and so on. Here should be added as well the positivistic dogma that all scientific theories could be reconstructed on a certain formal language, e.g. that one of the first or higher order predicate calculus, or the language of set theory. All these attempts end in failure and the persuasion that there are various types of scientific languages was gradually formed. This persuasion takes its foundations from the methodological pluralism, i.e. from the view according to which there is not an “absolute methodological system of reference”, and for this reason the very idea for a creation of an universal scientific language is a harmful fiction. However, the radical pluralistic point of view puts more questions than can resolve