Authors
Carl Ginet
Cornell University
Abstract
This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self-evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true that p and there exists no reason to believe that the proposition that p is incoherent, then one knows a priori that p. The paper argues that certain deeply contingent truths, e.g., the truth that I would now express by saying “I exist”, can be self-evident to, and thus known a priori by, the person they are about at the time they are about; but, since they cannot be known a priori, or even expressed, by anyone else or at any other time, they should not count as a priori truths.Este estudo desenvolve uma abordagem do que significa para uma proposição ser autoevidente para alguém, baseado na ideia de que certas proposições são tais que plenamente entendê-las significa crer nelas. Argumenta-se que, quando uma proposição p é autoevidente para alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço bem-vindo, uma justificação que não envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial de faculdade intuitiva; se, em adição, é verdade que p e não existe nenhuma razão para crer que p é incoerente, então sabe-se a priori que p. O estudo argumenta que certas proposições profundamente contingentes, por exemplo, a verda-de que eu agora expressaria ao dizer “Eu existo”, podem também ser auto-evidentes para e, portanto, conhecidas a priori pela pessoa sobre a qual elas são, no momento sobre o qual elas são; mas, uma vez que elas não podem ser conhecidas a priori, ou mesmo expressas, por qualquer outro ou em qualquer outro momento, elas não deveriam contar como verdades a priori.
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DOI 10.15448/1984-6746.2009.2.6813
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