Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73 (1992)

Carl Ginet
Cornell University
The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values of functions they understand perfectly well.
Keywords Epistemology  Meaning  Rule  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1992.tb00142.x
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References found in this work BETA

Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness.L. Wittgenstein - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (3-4):409-425.
Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge.Graeme Forbes - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:223-37.
XIII—Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge.Graeme Forbes - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84 (1):223-240.

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Killing Kripkenstein's Monster.Jared Warren - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):257-289.
Kripke’s Normativity Argument.José L. Zalabardo - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488.
Interaction and Self-Correction.Glenda L. Satne - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.

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