The dispositionalist solution to Wittgenstein's problem about understanding a rule: Answering Kripke's objection

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73 (1992)
The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values of functions they understand perfectly well.
Keywords Epistemology  Meaning  Rule  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1992.tb00142.x
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References found in this work BETA
Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness.L. Wittgenstein - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (3-4):409-425.

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