Was Kant a nonconceptualist?

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77 (2008)
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Abstract

I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought and judgment.

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Hannah Ginsborg
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason.Colin McLear - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):79-110.
From being to acting: Kant and Fichte on intellectual intuition.G. Anthony Bruno - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):762-783.
The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate.Colin McLear - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.

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References found in this work

Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):389-394.

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