Il problema della coscienza

Bérénice 46:43-64 (2014)

Rodolfo Giorgi
University of Pisa
In the twentieth century there was a fundamental debate on the problem of consciousness within a philosophical perspective. In fact, one of the most difficult tasks for a philosopher of mind is to comprehend the role of phenomenal properties. Some philosophers want to convince us that phenomenal properties are completely reducible to physical properties, whereas others admit that our consciousness possesses non physical qualities. My aim in this paper is to provide a dualist perspective in order to solve the problem of consciousness. There exist some intrinsic and subjective aspects of our perceptual experience of the world that cannot be identical with brain states. I maintain that the phenomenal facts are ontologically distinct from the physical facts and they are not reducible to them. I will demonstrate this thesis by taking into account the debate about whether conceptual analysis is required for reductive explanation. In the first two sections, I will present the main arguments against reductive physicalism and I will analyze the debate about conceptual analysis developed by Block & Stalnaker and Chalmers & Jackson. In the final section, I shall show that we can’t derive phenomenal truths from a complete physical knowledge of the world. Since we can’t support a reduction just on a posteriori identities between different kinds of phenomena, I maintain that the lack of a necessary conceptual connection between phenomenal properties and physical properties excludes reductive physicalism. Consequently, if we want to solve the mind-body problem we definitely need a dualist perspective.
Keywords consciousness  dualism  conceptual analysis  phenomenal properties
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