Autobiography and histrionics: An image of self-knowledge in Wittgenstein's later work

Ana Giraldo
Pontifica Universidad Javeriana
The aim of this paper is to explore the phenomenon of self-knowledge from a Wittgensteinian perspective, subject of great interest to the philosophy of psychology. Explaining even the first person authority, which, as we will show, it is difficult to explain from the externalist perspective of mental content identity. In Wittgenstein's later work, much of his thoughts are focused on the analysis of phenomenological states expressions such as 'I have pain', and propositional attitudes such as 'I think it's going to rain'. From the analysis of self-ascriptions of mental states, many philosophers have tried to build an image of what would be the self-knowledge for the Austrian philosopher in his later writings. The difference between these attempts lies in the type of use of language that will recognize in such self-ascriptions. In this article we show that Wittgenstein has a dual position in regard to the meaning of psychological verbs in the first person. On some occasions would use expressive in other, informational use. Self-knowledge and even first-person authority, are not only possible thanks to our acting ability but also our ability to tell an autobiography and that none of the three attempts that we will show is successful, although all three appear to find textual support in the work of Austrian philosopher
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