Theory and Decision 71 (1):23-32 (2011)

Abstract
We argue, in the spirit of some of Jean-Yves Jaffray's work, that explicitly incorporating the information, however imprecise, available to the decision maker is relevant, feasible, and fruitful. In particular, we show that it can lead us to know whether the decision maker has wrong beliefs and whether it matters or not, that it makes it possible to better model and analyze how the decision maker takes into account new information, even when this information is not an event and finally that it is crucial when attempting to identify and measure the decision maker's attitude toward imprecise information
Keywords Decision under uncertainy  Objective Information  Belief Formation  Methodology of Decision Theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-010-9197-4
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