The Monist 100 (1):16-37 (2017)
The question of the unity of consciousness is often treated as the question of how different conscious experiences are related to each other in order to be unified. Many contemporary views on the unity of consciousness are based on this bottom-up approach. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject undergoes one single conscious experience at a time. From this perspective, the problem of unity of consciousness becomes rather the problem of how we can distinguish a multiplicity of goings-on within our conscious experience at any time, given that it is unique. I will present three possible top-down approaches to unity of consciousness, which I call Priority unity monism, Existence unity monism, and Brentanian unity monism. Priority monism and Existence monism are defined in analogy with the homonymous metaphysical theories of object constitution. Brentanian monism retraces Franz Brentano’s view on unity of consciousness, and is defined by appeal to some of his mereological ideas. I will argue that the latter is the best top-down approach to unity of consciousness.
|Keywords||unity of consciousness priority monism existence monism Brentano|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Unity of Consciousness: In Defense of a Leibnizian View.Farid Masrour - forthcoming - In Christopher Hill David Bennett (ed.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press.
The Problem of the Unity of Consciousness: A Study of Apperception and Reflection.Scot William Anderson - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
Constituting the Mind: Kant, Davidson, and the Unity of Consciousness.Jeff Malpas - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):1-30.
Attentional Organization and the Unity of Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):56-87.
The Contents of Phenomenal Consciousness: One Relation to Rule Them All and in the Unity Bind Them.Antti Revonsuo - 2003 - Psyche 9 (8).
Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW]Timothy J. Bayne - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW]Tim Bayne - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
Added to index2016-03-10
Total downloads112 ( #43,995 of 2,169,342 )
Recent downloads (6 months)20 ( #16,644 of 2,169,342 )
How can I increase my downloads?