Introspective knowledge by acquaintance

Synthese 200 (2):1-23 (2022)
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Abstract

Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge we have by being directly aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to any sort of propositional knowledge and is wholly constituted by a relationship of introspective acquaintance. My main argument is that this is the best explanation of some epistemic facts about phenomenal consciousness and introspection. In particular, it best explains the epistemic asymmetry between a subject who has never had a certain phenomenal state and one who has. I also consider two theoretical objections to my claim: an objection from disunity and an objection from mysteriousness. I show that these objections can be answered and that introspective knowledge by acquaintance being sui generis remains a live option on the table.

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Anna Giustina
Universitat de Valencia

Citations of this work

Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge-by-Acquaintance First.Uriah Kriegel - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):458-477.
Beatrice Edgell’s Myth of the Given.Uriah Kriegel - 2024 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (3):587-605.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.

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