Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness

Abstract
Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of common sense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that they are typically based on introspection and introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue that such reasoning must guard against a potential conflation between two distinct introspective phenomena, which we call fact-introspection and thing -introspection; arguments for the unreliability of introspection typically target only the former, leaving the reliability of the latter untouched. In addition, we propose a theoretical framework for understanding thing -introspection that may have a surprising consequence: thing -introspection is not only reliable, but outright infallible. This points at a potential line of defense of phenomenal-belief justification, which here we only sketch very roughly
Keywords introspection  reliability  thing-awareness  fact-awareness  phenomenal beliefs  phenomenal knowledge  inner awareness  self-representation
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-016-0304-5
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References found in this work BETA
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.John B. Watson - 1913 - Psychological Review 20 (2):158-177.

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Citations of this work BETA
Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.
Transitivity and Transparency.Joseph Gottlieb - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379.

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