ProtoSociology 36:186-220 (2019)

Authors
Anna Giustina
University of Liège
Abstract
The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itself, which has been a central tenet of the phenomenological school, is a current topic in contemporary philosophical debates about consciousness and subjectivity, both in the continental and the analytic tradition. Typically, the self-awareness that accompanies every state of consciousness is char­acterized as pre-reflective. Most theorists of pre-reflective self-awareness seem to converge on a negative characterization: pre-reflective self-awareness is not a kind of reflective awareness. Whereas reflective self-awareness is attentive and descriptive, pre-reflective self-awareness is non-attentive and non-descriptive.This paper aims to show that the reflective/pre-reflective dichotomy overlooks a finer-grained distinction. The first part is devoted to arguing that the typical use of the adjective ‘pre-reflective’ conflates two properties, which are in fact separable. Accordingly, not only can there be non-descriptive and non-attentive self-consciousness, but also non-descriptive but attentive self-consciousness. I call the latter primitive introspection. The second part of the paper is devoted to arguing that, whereas both pre-reflective self-awareness and primitive introspection enable the subject to apprehend the phenomenology of their experience, the kind of apprehension each allows for is different. By analyzing the notion of apprehension in terms of information acquisition and personal-level availability of information, it is proposed that, although both pre-reflective self-awareness and primitive introspection allow for acquisition of the maximal amount of information about the experience, only primitive introspection makes all such information personal-level available.
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Social Science
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/protosociology2019367
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,410
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Introspection of Emotions.Bertille De Vlieger & Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Varieties of Self-Apprehension.Anna Giustina - 2019 - In Marc Borner, Manfred Frank & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. pp. 186-220.
Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
Reflexivity, Transparency, and Illusionism.Dan Zahavi - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:142-156.
Introspection Without Judgment.Anna Giustina - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86:407-427.
Against Deflation of the Subject.Nesic Janko - 2017 - Filozofija I Društvo 28 (4):1102-1121.
Subcortical Regions and the Self.Georg Northoff - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):100-101.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-08

Total views
4 ( #1,282,905 of 2,519,701 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,314 of 2,519,701 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes