Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):137-152 (2004)

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Kris McDaniel
Syracuse University
Abstract
In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap, the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; it is committed to compositional pluralism, which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and it is the modal analogue of endurantism, which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located.
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DOI 10.1080/713659792
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References found in this work BETA

Three Problems for “Strong” Modal Fictionalism.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (3):259-275.

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Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required).Karen Bennett - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.
Spacetime the One Substance.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):131 - 148.
Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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