Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):295-314 (2017)
AbstractCappelen and Dever have recently defended the view that indexicals are not essential: They do not signify anything philosophically deep and we do not need indexicals for any important philosophical work. This paper contests their view from the point of view of an account of intentional agency. It argues that we need indexicals essentially when accounting for what it is do something intentionally and, as a consequence, intentional action, and defends a view of intentional action as a possible conclusion of practical reasoning where the indexical is essential for the content of such a conclusion.
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Self-notions and top-down distortion.Daniel Morgan - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):277-294.