Indexicals: what they are essential for

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):295-314 (2017)
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Abstract

Cappelen and Dever have recently defended the view that indexicals are not essential: They do not signify anything philosophically deep and we do not need indexicals for any important philosophical work. This paper contests their view from the point of view of an account of intentional agency. It argues that we need indexicals essentially when accounting for what it is do something intentionally and, as a consequence, intentional action, and defends a view of intentional action as a possible conclusion of practical reasoning where the indexical is essential for the content of such a conclusion.

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Olav Gjelsvik
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
Self-notions and top-down distortion.Daniel Morgan - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):277-294.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
Logical Investigations.Gottlob Frege - 1977 - New Haven, CT, USA: Blackwell.

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