Quantification and realism

Abstract
This paper argues for the thesis that, roughly put, it is impossible to talk about absolutely everything. To put the thesis more precisely, there is a particular sense in which, as a matter of semantics, quantifiers always range over domains that are in principle extensible, and so cannot count as really being ‘absolutely everything’. The paper presents an argument for this thesis, and considers some important objections to the argument and to the formulation of the thesis. The paper also offers an assessment of just how implausible the thesis really is. It argues that the intuitions against the thesis come down to a few special cases, which can be given special treatment. Finally, the paper considers some metaphysical ideas that might surround the thesis. Particularly, it might be maintained that an important variety of realism is incompatible with the thesis. The paper argues that this is not the case.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00518.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,769
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Mass Nouns and Plural Logic.David Nicolas - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (2):211-244.
Vagueness and Quantification.Andrea Iacona - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (5):1-24.
Unrestricted Quantification.Salvatore Florio - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):441-454.
Is 'Everything' Precise?Dan López de Sa - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):397–409.
Plurals.Agustín Rayo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):411–427.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis.Howard Sankey - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):196-202.
Understanding the Separation Thesis.Joakim Sandberg - 2008 - Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (2):213-232.
Devitt on Moral Realism.Boran Berčić - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):63-68.
Attributing Properties.Benjamin Schnieder - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):315 - 328.
The Formulation of Disjunctivism: A Response to Fish.Paul F. Snowdon - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):129-141.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

125 ( #38,036 of 2,158,901 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #86,494 of 2,158,901 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums