Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (3):391-417 (2019)

Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock
Georgia State University
I present a reading of EE 5.12/NE 6.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue. On this account, the practically wise person's actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has. This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also cunning (δεινότης), able to execute his actions well. An important consequence of this reading is that the debate about whether Aristotle holds a Humean account of practical reason presupposes assumptions about the scope of rationality that Aristotle rejects.
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2019.0052
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