Abstract

This work is an analysis of the metaphysical, psychological, and normative conditions that are necessary and sufficient for individual persons to be morally responsible. It takes the content of responsibility, that is, what persons are responsible for, to include mental states as well as actions, omissions, and the consequences of actions and omissions. I hold that moral responsibility entails causal responsibility. A person is causally responsible for mental states, actions, and states of affairs just in case he has the capacity to respond to practical reasoning, to translate reasons into action, and to respond to theoretical reasoning concerning the likely consequences of what he does or fails to do. He is morally responsible if, in addition to these capacities, he has the normative capacity to respond to moral reasons for the right sorts of action. ;In Chapters One and Two, I examine the three psychological capacities necessary for moral responsibility. In Chapter Three, I challenge three principles that have figured prominently in the debate on moral responsibility. I argue that persons may be responsible for actions they are forced to perform, for failing to perform actions they are unable to perform, and for consequences that are not directly sensitive to their actions. In Chapter Four, I show how causal determinism is compatible with the notion that persons can act freely and responsibly. Three main theses distinguish this work from other work on the subject. First, the mental basis on which we act is at least as important as our actions themselves in explaining why we are responsible. Second, normative competence involves the capacity to have certain emotions, together with the capacity for practical and theoretical reasoning. Third, it is not the ability to do otherwise but rather the autonomy and causal efficacy of our motivational states and actions which can make us responsible even in a deterministic world.