Synthese 166 (2):281-307 (2009)

Authors
Michael Glanzberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic
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Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9285-3
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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Citations of this work BETA

Necessitarian Propositions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
Propositions and Compositionality.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):526-563.
Confessions of a Schmentencite: Towards an Explicit Semantics.Jonathan Schaffer - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (5-6):593-623.
Relativism 2: Semantic Content.Max Kölbel - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.

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