Erkenntnis 49 (1):57-91 (1998)

Authors
Steven Yalowitz
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Abstract
One central but unrecognized strand of the complex debate between W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson over the status of psychology as a science turns on their disagreement concerning the compatibility of strict psychophysical, semantic-determining laws with the possibility of error. That disagreement in turn underlies their opposing views on the location of semantic determinants: proximal (on bodily surfaces) or distal (in the external world). This paper articulates these two disputes, their wider context, and argues that both are fundamentally misconceived. There is no special tension between error and strict semantic-determining laws; moreover, the purported bearing of that issue on the dispute over the location of semantic determinants depends upon a mistaken conception of the relation between the nomic status of generalizations and degree of distance between explanans and it explananda. Finally, the wider significance of these conclusions for related contemporary debates is noted. And independent considerations about the possibility of communication, also present in Quine's and Davidson's thinking, are brought to bear on the question of the location of semantic determinants.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005330712554
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,587
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

View all 51 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Anomalous Monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Davidson's Social Externalism.Steven Yalowitz - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions.Kathrin Glüer - 2012 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International.
Why Quine is Not an Externalist.Robert Sinclair - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:279-304.
Computation and Intentional Psychology.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.
Models and Theories I: The Semantic View Revisited.Chuang Liu - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2):147 – 164.
The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity?Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
A Misconception of the Semantic Conception of Econometrics?Hsiang‐Ke Chao - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (1):125-135.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
35 ( #314,715 of 2,461,980 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #448,803 of 2,461,980 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes