In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press (2013)
We have argued against the thesis that content is essentially normative (Glüer & Wikforss 2009). In the course of doing so, we also presented some considerations against the thesis that belief is essentially normative. In this paper we clarify and develop these considerations, thereby paving the road for a fully non-normative account of the nature of belief.
|Keywords||belief truth norm rule guidance rationality reasons|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
Similar books and articles
The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Gluer and Wikforss.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):749-755.
The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen.K. Gluer & A. Wikforss - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):757-761.
The Right Thing to Believe.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 123-139.
No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Does Belief Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Truth: The Aim and Norm of Belief.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):121-136.
Added to index2012-05-21
Total downloads92 ( #55,701 of 2,163,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #33,659 of 2,163,620 )
How can I increase my downloads?