Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):421-437 (2012)

Authors
Kathrin Glüer
Stockholm University
Abstract
In previous work, I have defended a non-standard version of intentionalism about perceptual experience. According to the doxastic account, visual experience is a peculiar kind of belief: belief with “phenomenal” or looks-content. In this paper, I investigate what happens if this account of experience is combined with another idea I find very plausible: That the colors are to be understood in terms of color experience. I argue that the resulting phenomenal account of color experience captures everything essential to what has been called the “natural concept of color”. And I show that circularity worries are not aggravated by adopting this account instead of more standard forms of intentionalism—rather, they can be dispelled along the same lines
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 1333-1108
DOI 10.5840/croatjphil201212328
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Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.

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