Defeating looks

Synthese:1-28 (forthcoming)
Abstract
In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?
Keywords Epistemology of perception  Representational content of perceptual experience  Prima facie reasons  Looks  Phenomenal properties  Experience and Folk-psychology
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1186-x
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References found in this work BETA
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.

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Citations of this work BETA
Talking About Looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):781-807.

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