Eating Meat and Reading Diamond

Philosophical Papers 37 (1):157-175 (2008)
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Abstract

Here is a very common philosophical opinion: being human plays no important role in moral thinking. Call this the anti-humanist thesis. I argue that a thirty-year old paper by Cora Diamond, ‘Eating Meat and Eating People' (‘EMEP') can help us to see that the anti-humanist thesis is false

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Andrew Gleeson
Flinders University

Citations of this work

Basic Equality.Paul Sagar - 2024 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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References found in this work

Is the argument from marginal cases obtuse?Daniel A. Dombrowski - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2):223–232.

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