In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience

Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327 (2009)
Abstract
Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01364.x
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References found in this work BETA
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P.Craig French - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
The Epistemic Significance of Experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):947-967.
A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.

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