Moral ambition

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):285-299 (2009)
Abstract
The paper opens with an account of moral ambition which, it argues, is both a coherent ideal and an admirable trait. It closes with a discussion of some of the ways in which this trait might differ from traditional virtues such as temperance, courage, or benevolence
Keywords ambition  virtue  vice  second-order virtue
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802215596
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References found in this work BETA
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle - 1999 - Courier Dover Publications.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA
Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Glen Pettigrove - 2011 - Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.

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