Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):285-299 (2009)

Authors
Glen Pettigrove
University of Glasgow
Abstract
The paper opens with an account of moral ambition which, it argues, is both a coherent ideal and an admirable trait. It closes with a discussion of some of the ways in which this trait might differ from traditional virtues such as temperance, courage, or benevolence
Keywords ambition  virtue  vice  second-order virtue
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400802215596
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,677
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Two Kinds of Respect.Stephen Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
Perfectionism.Thomas Hurka - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Glen Pettigrove - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-10

Total views
57 ( #180,424 of 2,432,204 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #467,285 of 2,432,204 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes