Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):292-300 (2012)

Kathrin Glüer
Stockholm University
A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic visible properties. He suggests a semantics for looks-sentences that explains their intuitive truth values and is compatible with Parsimony. I argue that there is semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to a parsimonious one since there is a simpler semantics compatible with a phenomenalist understanding of looks, but not with Parsimony. This semantics provides a better explanation of the relevant truth value distribution
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.43
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References found in this work BETA

The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Experience and Content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
Phenomenal Character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.
Talking About Looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):781-807.

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