Probable causes and the distinction between subjective and objective chance

Noûs 31 (4):496-519 (1997)
Abstract
In this paper I present both a critical appraisal of Humphreys' probabilistic theory of causality and a sketch of an alternative view of the relationship between the notions of probability and of cause. Though I do not doubt that determinism is false, I claim that the examples used to motivate Humphreys' theory typically refer to subjective rather than objective chance. Additionally, I argue on a number of grounds that Humphreys' suggestion that linear regression models be used as a canonical form for the description of causal relations is untenable. I conclude by exploring the variety of ways in which probabilistic elements can be embedded into the structure of causal mechanisms. This investigation suggests both that deterministic mechanisms can produce stochastic behavior and stochastic mechanisms can produce deterministic behavior. Note: Link is to the article in a subscription database available to users affiliated with Butler University. Appropriate login information will be required for access. Users not affiliated with Butler University should contact their local librarian for assistance in locating a copy of this article
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00058
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,165
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Fitness and Propensity's Annulment?Marshall Abrams - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):115-130.
Introduction.Carl F. Craver & Lindley Darden - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):233-244.
Introduction.Carl F. Craver & Lindley Darden - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):233-244.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Nagel on Subjective and Objective.V. Haksar - 1981 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (March):105-21.
Some Remarks on the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Interpretations of the Attributes.Charles E. Jarrett - 1977 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 20 (1-4):447 – 456.
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Subjective and Objective.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. pp. 207-222.
On What We Know About Chance.Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance.Barry Loewer - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

174 ( #26,342 of 2,171,994 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #117,902 of 2,171,994 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums