Theoria 81 (3):272-279 (2015)

Authors
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin
Stockholm University
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen criticizes an argument we have called the “no-guidance argument”. He claims that our argument fails because it “presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour” and “betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm”. If these claims could be substantiated, the no-guidance argument would lose all interest. But Steglich-Petersen's attempt at substantiating them fails. The suggested sense in which the truth norm can guide behaviour turns out to be too wide to be recognizable as an intuitive notion of norm guidance. Moreover, it remains unclear how the truth norm could possibly provide an answer to the question whether it – rather than some other, possible norm for belief – is valid
Keywords truth norm  rule‐following  belief
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12057
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The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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