Mind 119 (475):757-761 (2010)

Authors
Asa Maria Wikforss
Stockholm University
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin
Stockholm University
Abstract
We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzq061
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