In this paper I offer a criticism of Carnap's inductive logic which also applies to other formal methods of inductive inference. Criticisms of Carnap's views have typically centered upon the justification of his particular choice of inductive method. I argue that the real problem is not that there is an agreed upon method for which no justification can be found, but that different methods are justified in different circumstances.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,873
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Causation, Prediction, and Search.Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):113-123.
Replies and Systematic Expositions.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ¸ Iteschilpp:Prc. Open Court. pp. 859--1013.
Carnap’s Theory of Probability and Induction.John G. Kemeny - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Open Court: La Salle. pp. 711--738.
Readings in the Philosophy of Science.Baruch A. Brody - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
66 ( #149,240 of 2,401,787 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #551,897 of 2,401,787 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes