PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:78 - 86 (1994)
In this paper I offer a criticism of Carnap's inductive logic which also applies to other formal methods of inductive inference. Criticisms of Carnap's views have typically centered upon the justification of his particular choice of inductive method. I argue that the real problem is not that there is an agreed upon method for which no justification can be found, but that different methods are justified in different circumstances.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
Machine Learning and the Foundations of Inductive Inference.F. Bergadano - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):31-51.
Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument About Induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist: Materials and Perspectives.Jaakko Hintikka (ed.) - 1975 - D. Reidel Pub. Co..
An Application of Information Theory to the Problem of the Scientific Experiment.Massimiliano Badino - 2004 - Synthese 140 (3):355 - 389.
Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games.Gerhard Schurz - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):200-220.
Induction: An Essay on the Justification of Inductive Reasoning.Nicholas Rescher - 1980 - Blackwell.
The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium.Jared Bates - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads26 ( #198,269 of 2,178,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #54,729 of 2,178,143 )
How can I increase my downloads?