Erkenntnis:1-7 (forthcoming)

Florian J. Boge
Bergische Universität Wuppertal
David Glick
University of California, Davis
Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analytically true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical reality. Thus, would-be detractors must reject QBism and other epistemic approaches to quantum theory on other grounds.
Keywords EPR  Tim Maudlin  Reality Criterion  QBism  Pragmatist Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00163-w
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The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy.Richard Healey - 2017 - Oxford University Press.

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