Inquiry 52 (3):232-254 (2009)
This essay argues that non-linguistic animals qualify not just for externalist notions of rationality (maximizing biological fitness or utility), but also for internal ones. They can act for reasons in several senses: their behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, they can act in the light of reasons - provided that the latter are conceived as objective facts rather than subjective mental states - and they can deliberate. Finally, even if they could not, it would still be misguided to maintain that animals are capable only of (mechanical) behaviour, not of (intentional) action
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980.Bernard Arthur Owen Williams - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Primate Cognition.Amanda Seed & Michael Tomasello - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):407-419.
Citations of this work BETA
Normativity, Agency, and Life.James Barham - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):92-103.
The Anthropological Difference: What Can Philosophers Do To Identify the Differences Between Human and Non-Human Animals?Hans-Johann Glock - 2012 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:105-131.
Is There a Role for Assent or Dissent in Animal Research?Holly Kantin & David Wendler - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (4):459-472.
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