(2009)

Authors
Hans-Johann Glock
University of Zürich
Abstract
This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,178
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

From a Logical Point of View.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Theories and Things.W. V. O. Quine (ed.) - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.James Cargile - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (2):320-323.

View all 41 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism.Xinli Wang - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.
Alternative Conceptual Schemes and A Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism.Xinli Wang - 2012 reprint - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:267-275.
Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar. [REVIEW]Cyrus Panjvani - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):623-626.
A Presuppositional Approach to Conceptual Schemes.Xinli Wang & Ling Xu - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):404-421.
From an Analysis of the Notion of Organization to Limits on Conceptual Diversity.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2013 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1):86-94.
Three Models of Conceptual Schemes.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):407 – 426.
Incommensurability in Cognitive Guise.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):29 – 43.
Why Conceptual Schemes?Maria Baghramian - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):287–306.
Filling Out the Picture: Wittgenstein on Differences and Alternatives. Bowell - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):203 – 219.
Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism.Peter M. S. Hacker - 2012 - Philosophical Investigations 35 (1):1-17.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-30

Total views
47 ( #229,293 of 2,454,961 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #303,322 of 2,454,961 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes