Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):69-94 (1992)

Abstract
Fodor & Pylyshyn (1981) criticize J. J. Gibson's ecological account of perception for failing to address what I call the 'correlation problem' in visual perception. That is, they charge that Gibson cannot explain how perceivers learn to correlate detectable properties of the light with perceptible properties of the environment. Furthermore, they identify the correlation problem as a crucial issue for any theory of visual perception, what I call a 'primary problem'—i.e. a problem which plays a definitive role in establishing the concerns of a particular scientific research program. If they are correct, Gibson's failure to resolve this problem would cast considerable doubt upon his ecological approach to perception. In response, I argue that both Fodor & Pylyshyn's problem itself and their proposed inferential solution embody a significant mistake which needs to be eliminated from our thinking about visual perception. As part of my response, I also suggest a Gibsonian alternative to Fodor & Pylyshyn's primary problem formulation
Keywords Epistemology  Language  Perception  Truth  Visual  Gibson, J
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DOI 10.1080/09515089208573044
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

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