Abstract

In this paper I provide a speech act analysis of microaggressions. After adopting a notion of microaggressions found in the political philosophy literature, I provide an account of both the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of microaggressions. I show that there are two parts to microaggressions’ illocutionary force: (i) the general Austinian linguistic conventions; (ii) socio-political conventions that change the speech act into a microaggression. Despite the varied speech acts that can count as microaggressions, I identify a unique perlocutionary effect common to all, perlocutionary frustration, in which the recipient of a microaggression is frustrated or inhibited from addressing the harms that microaggressions cause. The recipient is not necessarily silenced insofar as they are prevented from performing certain illocutionary acts. Instead, the illocutionary acts do not have their intended perlocutionary effects.