(2016)

Authors
Hans-Johann Glock
University of Zürich
Abstract
This paper is devoted to the role hinge propositions play or should play in epistemology and meta-philosophy. It starts by distinguishing different ways in which propositions can be basic or fundamental and by arguing that the foundational status of hinge propositions cannot be reduced to any of the others. The second part maintains that hinges have anti-sceptical potential, provided that one combines Wittgenstein’s critique of sense with Moore’s method of differential certainty. The final part briefly considers implications of the idea of hinge propositions for two debates in which they have not featured so far—once concerning peer disagreement, the other the role of intuitions in philosophy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5167/uzh-135394
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,304
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

‘Hinge Propositions’ and the ‘Logical’ Exclusion of Doubt.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):165-181.
How to Defeat Belief in the External World.Allan Hazlett - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.
Wittgenstein on Nonsignificant Propositions.Puqun Li - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Ottawa (Canada)
Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.
Introduction: Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):73-78.
Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification.Shaul Tor - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):81-108.
Hinge Propositions and Epistemic Justification.Anthony Brueckner - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-02-22

Total views
55 ( #168,703 of 2,330,230 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #255,210 of 2,330,230 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes