Synthese 190 (6):1017-1037 (2013)
An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical causation. She takes this to imply that causation is not fundamentally a matter of difference-making. In this paper, I defend the difference-making approach against Ney’s argument. I also offer some positive reasons for thinking, pace Ney, that causation is fundamentally a matter of difference-making
|Keywords||Causation Difference-making Causal foundationalism Physical causation Processes|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Physical Causation and Difference-Making.Alyssa Ney - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):737-764.
The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences.Peter Menzies & Christian List - 2010 - In Cynthia Mcdonald & Graham Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
Determinism and the Method of Difference.Urs Hofmann & Michael Baumgartner - 2011 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2):155-176.
Difference-Making in Context.Peter Menzies - 2004 - In J. Collins, N. Hall & L. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press.
Perception, Causal Understanding, and Locality.Christoph Hoerl - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press. pp. 207.
How Could There Be True Causal Claims Without There Being Special Causal Facts in the World?Mehmet Elgin - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):755-771.
Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions.Markus E. Schlosser - 2009 - In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos.
The Nonreductivist's Trouble with Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
EnviroGenomarkers: The Interplay Between Mechanisms and Difference Making in Establishing Causal Claims.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2012 - Medicine Studies 3 (4):249-262.
Added to index2011-12-21
Total downloads276 ( #11,848 of 2,177,828 )
Recent downloads (6 months)18 ( #17,191 of 2,177,828 )
How can I increase my downloads?