On the metaphysics of probabilistic causation: Lessons from social epidemiology

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1413-1423 (2002)

Authors
Bruce Glymour
Kansas State University
Abstract
I argue that the orthodox account of probabilistic causation, on which probabilistic causes determine the probability of their effects, is inconsistent with certain ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. In particular, scientists recognize the possibility that properties of populations can cause the behavior of members of the populations. Such emergent population‐level causation is metaphysically impossible on the orthodoxy.
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Reprint years 2003
DOI 10.1086/377418
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Dispositional Versus Epistemic Causality.Jon Williamson - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (3):259-276.
The Social Epidemiologic Concept of Fundamental Cause.Andrew Ward - 2007 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (6):465-485.

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