Logical truth and tarskian logical truth

Synthese 117 (3):375-408 (1998)
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This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.



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Mario Gomez-Torrente
National Autonomous University of Mexico

Citations of this work

The problem of logical constants.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-37.
Logical Truth.Mario Gomez-Torrente - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
To be fair.Benjamin L. Curtis - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):47-57.

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References found in this work

Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
The Development of Logic.William Kneale & Martha Kneale - 1962 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. Edited by Martha Kneale.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.

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