Philosophical Issues 9:369-379 (1998)
In his “What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?”, Robert Stalnaker finds no good argument for the claim that certain intuitive differences between perception and belief must be explained by a distinction between the kinds of content of perception states (which would have nonconceptual content) and belief states (which would have conceptual content). I object to Stalnaker that he does not examine arguments for this claim actually produced by its defenders. But I reach a conclusion of the same kind as Stalnaker’s after examining arguments for the claim found in the work of Tim Crane and Christopher Peacocke.
|Keywords||Concept Content Stalnaker, R|
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