Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):103-119 (2000)
The relevant modal logic G is a simple extension of the logic RT, the relevant counterpart of the familiar classically based system T. Using the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant modal logics, this paper proves three main results regarding G: (i) G is semantically complete, but only with a non-standard interpretation of necessity. From this, however, other nice properties follow. (ii) With a standard interpretation of necessity, G is semantically incomplete; there is no class of frames that characterizes G. (iii) The class of frames for G characterizes the classically based logic T
|Keywords||relevant modal logic relevance logic modal logic semantic incompleteness semantic completeness Routley–Meyer semantics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Neccessity, Vol. I.Alan R. Anderson & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Princeton University Press.
Relevant Logics and Their Rivals.Richard Routley, Val Plumwood, Robert K. Meyer & Ross T. Brady - 1982 - Ridgeview.
Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Vol. II.Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap & J. Michael Dunn - 1992 - Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Normal Modal Substructural Logics with Strong Negation.Norihiro Kamide - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (6):589-612.
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