Noûs 43 (3):450-489 (2009)

Abstract
On the face of it, normative conflicts are commonplace. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. That prompts the question, What are the proper principles of normative reasoning if such conflicts are possible? This paper examines several alternatives that have been proposed for a logic of 'ought' that can accommodate normative conflicts, and finds all of them unsatisfactory as measured against three criteria of adequacy. It then introduces a new logic that does meet all three criteria, and so allows for the possibility of genuine normative conflicts.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00714.x
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
Agency and Deontic Logic.John F. Horty - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Oughts, Options, and Actualism.Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.

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Citations of this work BETA

Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought.Justin Snedegar - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388.
Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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