Arguing at Cross-Purposes: Discharging the Dialectical Obligations of the Coalescent Model of Argumentation

Argumentation 17 (2):219-243 (2003)
David Godden
Michigan State University
The paper addresses the manner in which the theory of Coalescent Argumentation [CA] has been received by the Argumentation Theory community. I begin (section 2) by providing a theoretical overview of the Coalescent model of argumentation as developed by Michael A. Gilbert (1997). I next engage the several objections that have been raised against CA (section 3). I contend that objectors to the Coalescent model are not properly sensitive to the theoretical consequences of the genuinely situated nature of argument. I conclude (section 4) by suggesting that the resolution to the dispute between Gilbert and his objectors hinges on the outcome of several foundational theoretical questions identified over the course of the paper
Keywords Argument  argument-evaluation  argument-structure  argumentation  argumentation-analysis  coalescent-argumentation  Gilbert, Michael A.  informal-logic
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DOI 10.1023/A:1024032009784
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