On the Evolution of Behavioral Heterogeneity in Individuals and Populations

Biology and Philosophy 13 (2):205-231 (1998)

Authors
Peter Godfrey-Smith
University of Sydney
Abstract
A wide range of ecological and evolutionary models predict variety in phenotype or behavior when a population is at equilibrium. This heterogeneity can be realized in different ways. For example, it can be realized through a complex population of individuals exhibiting different simple behaviors, or through a simple population of individuals exhibiting complex, varying behaviors. In some theoretical frameworks these different realizations are treated as equivalent, but natural selection distinguishes between these two alternatives in subtle ways. By investigating an increasingly complex series of models, from a simple fluctuating selection model up to a finite population hawk/dove game, we explore the selective pressures which discriminate between pure strategists, mixed at the population level, and individual mixed strategists. Our analysis reveals some important limitations to the “ESS” framework often employed to investigate the evolution of complex behavior
Keywords game theory  ESS  mixed strategy  polymorphism  variation in behavior  finite populations
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1006588918909
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,878
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):613-617.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Methodology in Biological Game Theory.S. M. Huttegger & K. J. S. Zollman - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):637-658.
The Role of Social Interaction in the Evolution of Learning.R. Smead - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):161-180.
It Takes Two: Sexual Strategies and Game Theory.Armin W. Schulz - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 41 (1):41-49.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
10 ( #614,258 of 2,318,378 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #769,401 of 2,318,378 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature