Presumptions in argument: Epistemic versus social approaches

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Abstract

This paper responds to Kauffeld’s 2009 OSSA paper, considering the adequacy of his “commitment-based” approach to “ordinary presumptive practices” to sup-ply an account of presumption fit for general application in normative theories of argument. The central issue here is whether socially-grounded presumptions are defeasible in the right sorts of ways so as to pro-duce “truth-tropic” presumptive inferences.

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Citations of this work

Presumptions in Communication.Andrei Moldovan - 2016 - Studia Humana 5 (3):104-117.
On the strength of presumptions.Petar Bodlović - 2022 - Pragmatics and Cognition 29 (1):82-110.

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References found in this work

Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning.Douglas N. Walton - 1996 - Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.
Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition.Nicholas Rescher - 2006 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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