Reasonable Doubt: A Note on ‘Neutral’ Illatives and Arguments [Book Review]

Argumentation 13 (3):243-250 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as ‘so’, ‘therefore’, and ‘hence’ convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,264

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The generality of particular thought.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):508-531.
Soames and widescopism.David Hunter - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):231 - 241.
Reply to professor Craig.Graham Oppy - 1995 - Sophia 34 (2):15-29.
The normativity of the intentional.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence.Klaas J. Kraay - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (2):203-228.
Common Sense, Strict Incompatibilism, and Free Will.Boris Rähme - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (1):107-124.
Probability out of court: Notes on 'guilt beyond reasonable doubt'.Stephen Cohen & Michael Bersten - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):229 – 240.
Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.Ofra Magidor - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):471-491.
Descartes' argument for the claim that his essence is to think.Michael Hooker - 1975 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):143-163.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-11

Downloads
12 (#805,569)

6 months
1 (#449,844)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

G. C. Goddu
University of Richmond

Citations of this work

On Defining ‘Argument’.Jeffrey Goodman - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (4):589-602.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Propositional Relevance.George Bowles - 1990 - Informal Logic 12 (2).
The validation of induction.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):62 – 76.
Favorable Relevance and Arguments.George Bowles - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (1).

Add more references